Williams v James Brodies and Company Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Belize
• Court: Court of Appeal (Belize)
• Judge: Mr. D. E. G. Malone
• Judgment Date: 08 March 1976
• Neutral Citation: BZ 1976 CA 4
• Docket Number: Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1975
• Date: 08 March 1976

Court of Appeal

Malone, C.J.

Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1975

Williams

and

James Brodies and Company Limited

The Director of Public Prosecutions with Mr. R. E. Lindsay for the Appellant

The Honourable V.H. Courtenay et al for the Respondent

Criminal Law - Sale at price higher than the controlled price

Facts: No case submission upheld by magistrate — Appeal — Whether sale a retail sale within definition of ‘Retail’ in reg. 2(i) of Supplies (Control)(Prices) Regulations, No. 8 of 1972 — Necessary to look at reg. 3(iii) for guidance

Held: The sale was a retail sale for purposes of regulations — The prosecution had made out a case for the defence to answer — Appeal upheld — Case remitted to Chief Magistrate.

1 Before Mr. D. E. G. Malone, Chief Justice

2 An invoice of the respondent of goods charged to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps at the Airport Camp and dated the 22nd August, 1975, records the following transaction:

“75 lbs. Local Fish Fillet 2.05 153.75”.

3 At date the maximum retail price for local fillet fish was $1.00 per lb. By virtue provisions of regulation 10 (1) of the Supplies (Control) (Prices) Regulations, No.8 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the regulations”) it is an offence, without permission of the Controller of Supplies, to: “sell any price-controlled goads mentioned in any part of the First or Second Schedule hereto at a price higher than the maximum selling price permitted by these Regulations … …”

4 An information was an the 19th September, 1975, laid against the respondent charging the respondent with selling 75 lbs. of local fillet fish at $1.05 in excess of the maximum retailed price permitted by the regulations. The excess over the controlled price is in fact slightly less as the respondent allows a discount of 10% on sales to the Army. That, however, is not a factor of any importance in this case.

5 At the close of the prosecution's case, it was submitted by Counsel for the respondent that there was no case to answer. The grounds of the submission being that the sale — which was not disputed — had not been proved to be a sale by retail within the definition of “retail” in regulation 2 (i) of the regulations. That submission was upheld by the learned Chief Magistrate. Against that ruling of the learned Chief Magistrate, the appellant appealed, giving as his grounds of appeal that:

• “(1) The decision of the Learned Magistrate that the prosecution did not establish the commission of an offence contrary to Regulation 10(1) of Statutory Instrument No. 8/72 cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.

• (2) The learned Magistrate's finding that Regulation 12 (I) (d) of Statutory Instrument No. 8/72 is ultra vires the power of the Minister is erroneous in law”.

6 Ground (2) was abandoned at this hearing by the appellant.

7 Lengthy argument was advanced by bath sides before me as to the meaning to be given to the words “wholesale” and “retail” in regulation 2 (i) of the Regulations there was equally lengthy expression of views by Counsel as to the practices of a free market. So far as the definitions of “wholesale” and “retail” are concerned, they have a bearing on this case, but as I shall endeavour to show, the decision reached an this appeal will be the same whether the meaning given to those definition by Counsel for the respondent is accepted or whether the meaning given to them by the learned Director of Public Prosecutions is accepted. So far as the varying views on the practices of a free market are concerned, I do not think that they are of much assistance. When one is dealing with price control regulations, the temptation is present to construe them in terms of conditions that prevail on a free market. That, however, is a temptation to be resisted because from the very fact that price controls have been introduced, the market has ceased to be free. New conditions now prevail. The conditions are those stipulated by the regulations.

8 The definitions of “retail” and of “wholesale” are to be found in regulation 2(i) of the regulations and they are respectively as follows:

“retail” means the sale of goods in any quantity less than the quantity specified in the definition of “wholesale” in these regulations;

“wholesale” means the sale of goads relating to–

• (a) as regards goods in respect of which a wholesale unit is specified in the First or Second Schedule hereto, any quantity not less than such wholesale unit;

• (b) as regards other goods, any quantity not less than that contained in the smallest package in which such goods are ordinarily sold by wholesalers to retailers or if such goods are not ordinarily sold in packages by wholesaler to retailers, the smallest quantity of such goods which is ordinarily sold by wholesalers to retailers”.

9 It is the submission of the Counsel for the respondent that “wholesale” and “retail” are defined purely in terms of quantity. As opposed to that submission is the submission of the learned Director of Public Prosecutions that the definitions are in terms of both quantity and price and that account must be taken of those two elements to determine whether a given sale is a sale by wholesale or a sale by retail learned Chief Magistrate. As the regulations do not specify a unit in relation to local Why did he find that this sale was not a sale by retail? By the definitions of “retail” and “wholesale” sales which are not sales by wholesale are sales by retail. To determine the nature of the instant sale on the basis of Counsel for the respondent's, submissions as to quantity, the logical approach would he to see if the transaction was one that fell within the definition of “wholesale”. If it was not such, then it would be a sale by “retail”. I venture to think that was the approach adopted by the learned Chief...