Sun-Bay Development Company Ltd v Registrar of Lands
| Jurisdiction | Belize |
| Judge | Madam Justice Martha Alexander |
| Judgment Date | 21 August 2023 |
| Court | Supreme Court (Belize) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL APPEAL No. 9 of 2023 |
THE HONOURABLE Madam Justice Martha Alexander
CIVIL APPEAL No. 9 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BELIZE A.D. 2023
KEYWORDS: Land — Registrar of Lands — Registered Land — Appeals — Case Stated — Case Stated Appeals — Procedure for Appeals under CPR Sections 60 and 61 — Inferior Tribunal Appeals to High Court — Jurisdiction
Ms. Lissette V. Staine, Counsel for the Appellant
Ms. Agassi Finnegan, Counsel for the First Respondent
Mr. Andrew Marshalleck S.C. for the Second Respondent
This decision relates to a preliminary objection taken by the second respondent (“Kevin Knasel”), challenging the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the appeal of the appellant (“Sun-Bay”) from a decision of the Registrar of Lands (“the Registrar”). The objection relates to the procedure adopted to bring the appeal. Sun-Bay's appeal originated by way of written Notice of Appeal dated February 22, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was filed pursuant to the provisions of Part 60.2(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (“CPR”). Part 60.2(1) specifies that an appeal is made by Notice of Appeal using Form 23 and must annex the grounds of appeal (“a direct appeal”).
The Registrar's decision was made under and by virtue of the Registered Land Act (“the Act”), which confers the right of appeal and provides the avenue for appeal of decisions made pursuant to its provisions. The decision was given by letter dated February 08, 2023 and issued to parties by way of email on February 10, 2023. Sun-Bay filed a Notice of Appeal on February 22, 2023 against the Registrar's decision.
Counsel for Kevin Knasel argues that the procedure used is incorrect as the court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal of the Registrar's decision under Part 60.2(1). The proper procedure for appealing the Registrar's decision is by way of case stated under Part 61 and not, as done by Sun-Bay, by way of a direct appeal under Part 60. Having brought a direct appeal, the court has no jurisdiction and the Notice of Appeal must be dismissed.
Counsel for Kevin Knasel argues, also, that the statute provides a single mode of approaching the High Court to appeal a decision of the Registrar, which is by way of case stated. Having conferred the right of appeal and defined the court's jurisdiction for entertaining the appeal, an appellant seeking to challenge a decision under the Act must follow the procedure for appeals by case stated as set out in Part 61.
Counsel for Sun-Bay resists Kevin Knasel's objection as to jurisdiction and the applicable procedure. She argues that the Act provides two distinct and separate avenues for advancing an appeal of the Registrar's decision to the High Court. She submits that the Act confers both a right of an appeal by way of case stated and a direct right of appeal on any person aggrieved by the Registrar's decision, direction, order, determination or award (hereinafter together referred to as “decision”). The argument that the Act provides only a single, joint procedure for appeal of the Registrar's decision is erroneous. Counsel asks that the preliminary point not be upheld but be dismissed.
I find that the appeal is properly before me and dismiss the preliminary objection with costs. The right of appeal is conferred by section 145 of the Act and Sun-Bay has used the correct procedure in Part 60 of the CPR to bring the appeal before this Court.
The issue before this court is whether the Act entitles Sun-Bay to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of a Notice of Appeal under Part 60 of the CPR after a final decision of the Registrar or the Registrar must appeal by way of case stated under Part 61 of the CPR.
Counsel for Kevin Knasel submits that Sun-Bay has used the wrong procedure for the current appeal, by coming under Part 60 (direct appeal) and not Part 61, which provides for appeals by way of case stated. He states that the Act, conferring the right of appeal and then giving the court jurisdiction to entertain it, provides for how appeals of decisions made under it must be advanced to the High Court. The Act provides for a single mode of approaching the court to appeal a decision of the Registrar, which is by way of case stated. Sections 144 and 145 must be read together to show that single right of appeal, by case stated, to be formulated by the Registrar. Further, initiating an appeal via Part 60, and not Part 61, is not only the wrong procedure but; it allows Sun-Bay to effectively usurp the power of the Registrar to state the issues. This wrong procedure enables Sun-Bay to vest the power, usually exercisable by the Registrar, in itself and to circumvent the requisite conditions for the prosecution of an appeal under the enactment. A procedure that excludes the Registrar's role in prosecuting an appeal is not contemplated by the Act and is procedurally improper.
Sun-Bay responds that the procedures set out in Part 61 are irrelevant to this appeal since they relate to appeals by way of case stated pursuant to section 144. This appeal does not fall under section 144 but section 145, since both sections provide for distinct types of appeals. Sun-Bay, who is appealing a final decision of the Registrar, is entitled to bring a direct appeal under section 145 of the Act.
Sun-Bay's counsel frames her arguments in opposition based on the canons of statutory interpretation, specifically on the natural, ordinary and grammatical use of the words used in sections 144 and 145. She advances that these provisions provide for two separate and distinct avenues for advancing an appeal. It is section 145 that allows for an appeal of a final decision of the Registrar who is at that point functus.
The kernel of the submissions of counsel is that there is no justification for interpreting a statute that is clear and unambiguous in the restrictive way proposed by counsel for Kevin Knasel. Section 144 is left for questions posed to get clarification during the proceedings before the Registrar, before she is functus. A section 145 appeal is not possible without a final decision. Sun-Bay's appeal is filed pursuant to a final decision given by the Registrar, not an interim order or decision given during the course of the proceedings. Unless the Registrar issues a final decision or order, there is nothing to appeal from under section 145. The argument of a single right of appeal by way of case stated is erroneous. The appeal is properly before the court, which has the jurisdiction to hear it.
The process to determine the preliminary point raised by Kevin Knasel is an exercise of statutory interpretation. The modern approach to statutory interpretation is encapsulated in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in R (on the application of O (a minor, by her litigation friend AO)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. 1 I have taken the liberty to quote liberally from the statements at paragraphs 29-31 as I find them important and helpful:
29. The courts in conducting statutory interpretation are “seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used”: Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591, 613 per Lord Reid of Drem. More recently, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated:
“ Statutory interpretation is an exercise which requires the court to identify the meaning borne by the words in question in the particular context.”
( R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] AC 349, 396). Words and passages in a statute derive their meaning from their context. A phrase or passage must be read in the context of the section as a whole and in the wider context of a relevant group of sections. Other provisions in a statute and the statute as a whole may provide the relevant context. They are the words which Parliament has chosen to enact as an expression of the purpose of the legislation and are therefore the primary source by which meaning is ascertained. There is an
important constitutional reason for having regard primarily to the statutory context as Lord Nicholls explained in Spath Holme, 397:“ Citizens, with the assistance of their advisers, are intended to be able to understand parliamentary enactments, so that they can regulate their conduct accordingly. They should be able to rely upon what they read in an Act of Parliament.”
30. External aids to interpretation therefore must play a secondary role. Explanatory notes, prepared under the authority of Parliament, may cast light on the meaning of particular statutory provisions. Other sources, such as Law Commission reports, reports of Royal Commissions and advisory committees, and Government White...
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