Re Horn, Clifton

• Jurisdiction: Belize
• Court: Supreme Court (Belize)
• Judge: Malone, C.J.
• Judgment Date: 21 December 1978
• Docket Number: Appeal No. 4 of 1978
• Date: 21 December 1978

Supreme Court

Malone, C.J.

Appeal No. 4 of 1978

Re: Horn, Clifton

Appearances:

Mr. D. R. Lindo for the Appellants

The Solicitor General for the Revising officer

Practice and procedure - Whether evidence wrongly admitted

1 Save that appeal of Yvonne Lindo includes as a ground of Appeal that “extraneous evidence was admitted”, the grounds of appeal of the appellants are otherwise the same, namely that:

1

the revising officer lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter in as much as the purported objection was served out of time; 2. the notice was not delivered to the appellant as required by Regulation 22 (Schedule II); 3. the revising officer based his decision on hearsay evidence; 4. inadmissible evidence was wrongly admitted; and 5. the appellant was not given an opportunity to answer the objection.

2 The three cases giving rise to these appeals came up for hearing on the 3rd October, 1978, before the revising officer with 27 others. By virtue of Rule 50 (2) of the Representation of the People Registration Rules 1978, (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”), an appeal under the Rules becomes an appeal under Part VIII of the Supreme Court of Judicature Ordinance, Chapter 5. The effect of that Rule, as I understand it, is that the provisions of that part of that Ordinance govern appeals made under the Rules. Of those provisions, one is section 130(a) which declares that this Court shall not be competent to entertain a ground of appeal alleging that the Inferior Court had no jurisdiction in the matter, unless objection to the jurisdiction of the Inferior Court was taken formally at some time during the progress of the case and before the decision was pronounced. In the course of the hearing before the revising officer, objection was taken to his jurisdiction on the ground that the copies of the notices of objection required by Rule 22(2) of the Rules to be delivered to the appellants had not been delivered within the time specified in that Rule. That ground is one of the grounds of appeal. But in the course of the submissions made in respect of that ground, it was also submitted that the revising officer had no jurisdiction on the ground that Mr. Musa was the objector and that he was not qualified to object to the inclusion in the first register of the names of the appellants. To my mind, that latter objection to the jurisdiction of the revising officer is not one that this court is now competent to entertain, as formal objection on that ground was not made at the hearing before the revising officer. In any event, I am satisfied from the record and from the evidence given before me by the revising officer, who was called by me to clarify the record in this and in other respects, that Mr. Musa was not in fact the objector. He appeared as counsel on behalf of Mr. Gibbs who was the objector, but also gave some evidence. A dual role which perhaps gave rise to some confusion.

3 The record shows that the three cases in question were heard together. This procedure doubtless was followed not only for the convenience of the witnesses, but also for the convenience of Mr. Lindo who was counsel for each of the three appellants. Because that was the procedure adopted, and because also these three cases were in a batch of 30 of which some were disposed of before these three cases were heard and some after, it is possible that counsel for the appellants is a little confused as to the sequence of events. I am, however, satisfied by the evidence given before me by the revising officer that in arriving at his decision he paid no regard to an affidavit of a Miss Reynard which Mr. Musa, in his capacity as counsel for Mr. Gibbs, had sought to introduce as evidence in the case of the appellant Yvonne Lindo. The revising officer's ruling on the affidavit does not appear on the record, but the lack of a note to that effect is, I think, to be attributed to the fact that the affidavit in question was tendered with others which related to another case that was subsequently withdrawn by Mr. Musa in his capacity as counsel for Mr. Gibbs. Being so satisfied disposes of the ground of appeal that relates solely to the case of Yvonne Lindo, as that ground rests on the supposition that the affidavit of Miss Reynard had been admitted as a part of the evidence.

4 It is clear from the revising officer's notes of the proceedings that Mr. Lindo was asked if he was calling witnesses and replied “No,” for in the notebook of the revising officer appears the following sentence, “Mr. Lindo states he will not bring any witness.”

5 That sentence is not to be found in the record. But as that record was prepared from the revising officer's notes, I regard the omission of that sentence from the record as an oversight. Accordingly, I find that there is no substance in the fifth of the grounds of appeal applicable to all the appellants. Namely that: “5. The Appellant was not given an opportunity to answer the objection.”

6 By Rule 22(2) of the Rules, a person wishing to object to a name appearing on the first register must deliver notice of his objection, “within 14 days of the date of the publication of the first register” to the registering officer and must deliver a copy of the notice within that time to the person to whose name on the first register he objects. By section 2(2) of the Representation of the People Ordinance, No. 2 of 1978, (hereinafter referred to as “the Ordinance”), it is provided that: “(2) Any reference to “this Ordinance” shall, where the context permits, include a reference to any rules or regulations made thereunder.”

7 In the Rules, there is not to be found a provision governing the method of publishing the first register, but as section 2(3) of the Ordinance does contain a provision which enables to be published by any one of several methods any register which, “is by or under this Ordinance required to be published”, it is, I think, clear that that section governs the method of publication of the first register for the purpose of the Rules. The following are the several methods which, by section 2(3) of the Ordinance, a register may be published:

• “(a) publishing it in the Gazette; or

• (b) making copies thereof available for inspection at the office of the Chief Elections Officer and that of the Registrar; or

• (c) by affixing such register…. to the courthouse or courthouses in the district to which the register ……. relates or such other conspicuous place in that electoral division as the person publishing considers necessary; or

• (d) by advertising it in a newspaper circulating in the area to which such register ……..relates, or by specifying in such an advertisement the places at which such register….. is available for inspection; or

• (e) by placards or handbills; or

• (f) by such other manner approved by the Commission as the person publishing thinks is best calculated to afford information to the persons who should receive such information.”

8 In the instant case, the first register, it is agreed by both counsel, was dealt with by the registering officer as follows. It was stenciled and dated the 11th August, 1978, and was on the 12th August sent to the Chief Elections Officer. Then on the 13th August, which was a Sunday, the registering officer affixed it to the outside of the door of his office. I do not consider that the stenciling and dating of the first register constituted a publishing. Nor do I consider that the sending of it on the 12th August, to the Chief Elections Officer, in the absence of any evidence (of which there is none) that copies...