Re Director of Public Prosecutions
| Jurisdiction | Belize |
| Judge | Staine, C.J. |
| Judgment Date | 18 February 1980 |
| Court | Supreme Court (Belize) |
| Docket Number | Action No. 25 of 1980 |
| Date | 18 February 1980 |
Supreme Court
Staine, C.J.
Action No. 25 of 1980
Director of Public Prosecutions, supporting the Motion
Mr. Dean Barrow, for the respondent
Criminal law - Contempt of court — Respondent fined for his article which contained statements which tended to obstruct justice by bringing the authority of the Supreme Court and the administration of justice into disrepute.
This is the motion by the Director of Public Prosecutions of Belize for an order that the respondent Harry Lawrence, editor of the newspaper entitled “The Reporter”; be committed for contempt in publishing an article containing a letter addressed to that newspaper, and which letter contained statements and comments which tend to obstruct public justice by bringing the authority of the Supreme Court and its administration into disrepute and disregard. Preliminary arguments were heard on the 11th February, following. The action came on for hearing on the 13th February, 1980.
Attached to the motion of the Director of Public Prosecutions was the opening statement contained in an affidavit that his office paid an annual subscription to the Reporter Press for the weekly delivery to his office of a copy of the Reporter, and in accordance with an agreement an issue bearing the date 27th January, 1980 was delivered and received at his office on the 26th January, 1980.
In the said copy of the newspaper to which reference has been made there appeared on page 2 thereof a letter to the editor under the heading ‘Strange Ways’.
I would at this stage say in passing that in a supporting affidavit the respondent Harry Lawrence has admitted to being the publisher of the Reporter newspaper, and also of having published the offending letter.
In respect of the letter appearing in the newspaper, attached to his affidavit, the Director of Public Prosecutions has submitted in paragraph 7 of his affidavit a submission in which he declares that in his opinion the said letter contained in the particular issue of the newspaper statements and comments which are scandalous of the judges and of the Supreme Court of Belize, and which, are calculated to obstruct public justice by bringing the Supreme Court's authority and administration of the laws of Belize into disrepute and disregard to certain matters.
The Director of Public Prosecutions thereafter sets out in six separate paragraphs matters to which he draws attention and argues that they are in contempt of court. These are from (a) to (f):
-
(a) ‘Our Supreme Court seems to be acting in strange ways’.
-
(b) ‘Certainly it has disillusioned the many good citizens,
-
(c) ‘Approximately half the country, who had put their trust in the ability of the Courts, to hear an election petition and intervene to correct a fraud’.
-
(d) ‘As I see it even if we were to appeal here, it would not do any good for our country seems to have lost all concept of what is right and what is strange.’
-
(e) ‘Truth is no longer a fixed star’.
-
(f) ‘The politicians now have the ability to change and distort it at will.’
-
(g) ‘It also amazes me that the very people who profess to be intelligent are the ones who are undermining our moral weakening of the country by destroying the will within us.’
I would say at this point that the very fact of imputing the lack of impartiality on the part of the courts is, by virtue of the authorities, a matter which is scandalous. I may return to this theme, and if I do, I hope it is properly understood that what I am attempting to do by virtue of such dicta that fall from my lips, is to make it abundantly clear, that in the context of contempt of court, “scandalous” does not bear the same meaning as it does in everyday parlance. The definition or view should be borne in mind throughout the context of this judgment.
It also seems an appropriate point at which I might interject a case the product from my own researches. I quote from the judgment in the case of R v Hinds ex parte the Attorney General. This case is reported at (1960) 3 W.I.R. p 13, and I quote from the judgment of Stoby, C.J. where, speaking about scandalizing the court, the learned Chief Justice had this to say:
“In all the cases dealing with contempt of court by scandalizing the court or a judge, great stress is laid on the right of the press to criticize. In a democracy the right of the press to criticize the conduct of public men is readily treated as one of the great safeguards of a free society. Any man, be he judge, magistrate, politician or civil servant, must expect to have his conduct exposed to public glare. The knowledge that legitimate and forceful criticism will be forthcoming acts as a check to arbitrary actions by public men. Perhaps knowledge that criticism will be forthcoming acts as a check to arbitrary actions by public men. Perhaps nowadays criticism is not always employed with the purest of motives. With the advent of a wider reading public, of greater competition among newspapers, pandering to public taste has become more important than constructive criticism. The Christian virtue of charity, the desire not to misrepresent facts, are gradually becoming lost virtues, but public men must be prepared to have their actions analysed in the light of what the modern press consider appropriate, and, provided the law is not infringed, bad taste and dishonest criticism must be treated as the penalty for temporary importance. But although the press has a notable duty to perform, it is not an unbridled champion. When it elects to condemn the administration of justice it must take care that the structure is rotten and deserves condemnation; for great and essential as is the function of the press, the necessity for public confidence in the administration of justice is greater.”
I have thought it desirable to intersperse at this point, the products of my own research. For, when one speaks of an article which is calculated to have a certain effect, I think it is desirable that in drawing attention to the judgment of a court, with the intention of showing how that court in similar circumstances has dealt with the situation, the prevailing conditions should be, as nearly as possible, the same or similar in so far as that objective can be attained. The case of R v Hinds was a case decided by the Supreme Court of Barbados, which has a population or had in 1960 a population of 234,000 persons and a Bench of three. In Belize, we have a population varying, according to statistics which may not be altogether reliable, between 120,000 and 160,000. We, likewise, in referring to the Supreme Court, are referring to a Bench of three. It can be seen therefore that when one speaks of the judges of the Supreme Court, one is speaking of the Bench which it is not difficult to envisage nor difficult to identify, having regard to our size and our population.
This fact should constantly be borne in mind when one is considering whether the Supreme Court of Belize and the judges thereof have been scandalized, or whether the court authority and the administration of the laws in Belize has been bought into disrepute and disregard.
Elaborating on his submissions to the court, the learned Director of Public Prosecution continue outlining what he had read as being a true meaning of the letter captioned “Strange Ways.”
He submitted that in order to gather the true meaning of the letter, it was necessary to read it in its entirety, in order first to see what view the letter really intended to canvass, and secondly to see what could be understood from the expressions contained in the letter having regard to its entire contents.
In this connection, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that the writer of the letter was intending to convey to the readers thereof his view that there was no purpose in presenting disputed election petitions to the Supreme Court, because that court, it would appear, was not acting impartially, and that since we were still under British rule it might perhaps, it would appear, be better to appeal to the Supreme Courts in England when such actions as those eliciting an election petition or petitions arose. And, continued the learned Director of Public Prosecutions, the writer of the letter did not leave his readers without the answer to the questions he had posed. He continued, in paragraph 4 of the letter under reference, to state that the Supreme Court was simply acting in strange ways as disillusioned among good solid citizens, approximately half the country who had put their trust in the ability of the courts to hear an election petition and intervene to correct a flaw. Continuing in this vein, the writer continued, said the Director of Public Prosecutions, that it would seem that the country seemed to have lost all concept of what is right and what is wrong, and in the context of the whole letter by referring to the whole country the writer was clearly intending to include the judges of the Supreme Court.
Continuing, the Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that the writer of the letter in expressing himself, intended to convey to his readers, that truth was no longer a fixed star and the politicians had the ability to change and distort it at will. In substance, submitted the Director, this was clearly saying that the Supreme Court of this country is susceptible to political influence. This would necessarily connote that the Supreme Court was not free from bias, but which is worse, had become the servant to all politicians whose bidding the Supreme Court had to carry out.
Approaching the end of his submissions, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that when read as a whole, the clear meaning of the letter was that it was referring specifically to the Judges of the Supreme Court. And the letter went on to suggest that this was being...
To continue reading
Request your trial