Ramos v R, Bent v R

• Jurisdiction: Belize
• Court: Court of Appeal (Belize)
• Judge: Inniss J.A.
• Judgment Date: 27 February 1974
• Neutral Citation: BZ 1974 CA 9
• Docket Number: Criminal Appeals Nos. 3 and 4 of 1973
• Date: 27 February 1974

Court of Appeal

Bourke, P.; Hogan, J.A.; Inniss, J.A.

Criminal Appeals Nos. 3 and 4 of 1973

Ramos

and

Regina

Bent

and

Regina

Criminal Law - Defences — Unsworn statements of accused

Criminal Law - Trial by jury — Directions to jury — Unsworn statements

Practice and Procedure - Trial by jury — Directions to jury — Defences

Facts: Failure to state particulars of defence in each unsworn statement — Appeal against conviction — Whether trial judge had failed to put defence to jury

Facts: Appellants convicted on charge of robbery — Failure to state particulars of defence in each unsworn statement made from dock — Whether trial judge failed to put defence fully to jury

Facts: Defences stated in each unsworn statement — Whether the trial judge had failed to put the defence fully to the jury

Held: Appeals dismissed on the ground that the defence was vague.

Held: Defence vague — Appeals dismissed.

Held: That once an accused person has decided to make an unsworn statement in order to establish a particular line of defence, he must state that line of defence clearly. Appeals dismissed.

1 Delivered by Inniss J.A.

Inniss J.A.

2 In these Appeals, which were consolidated, each Appellant appeals against his conviction of Robbery.

3 At the hearing only one ground of Appeal was pressed in argument. In the case of each Appeal it was in the following terms:–

“The trial judge failed to give any proper directions to the Jury as to the effect of the statement given by the appellant.”

4 In support of this ground Mr. Courtenay, of Counsel for the Appellants, submitted that the learned Trial Judge in his summing-up had indicated to the Jury that the import of the Appellants' unsworn statements was that they were not at the scene of the alleged crime at the material time and that this was inconsistent with questions put by Counsel for the Appellants to Sgt. Willoughby, the only identifying witness, in cross-examination, which suggested that they were present but only going about their business. He conceded that there was nothing in the unsworn statement of the Appellant Ramos to suggest that its import was any different from that expressed by the learned Trial Judge to the Jury. He contended, however, that it was not a necessary inference from the unsworn statement of Appellant Bent that the two Appellants were not at the scene, and submitted that the learned Trial Judge ought to have put to the Jury not only his own view of the import of the Appellants' statements but all issues arising on them. He further submitted that it was all the more important for the Judge to do this in a case in which the identification of the Appellants as two of the men who ran off after attacking Santos Ayuso depended on the testimony of one witness only. In this connection Mr. Courtenay cited Arthurs v. Attorney General of Northern Ireland (1971) 55 Cr. App. R. 161. This case dealt in a general way with the sufficiency of directions to a Jury where the case against the defendant depended wholly or substantially on the visual identification of the defendant by one or more witnesses. It was pointed out, however, that there was no ground of appeal which raised any such issue; and we understand Mr. Courtenay's reference to identification by a single witness to be limited to emphasizing the special importance which he submitted attached to the judge putting to the Jury, in a case of that kind, all issues arising on the Appellants' unsworn statements.

5 Whilst comment on inconsistency between an accused's statement and cross-examination by counsel is subject to the danger that it can involve a measure of misunderstanding between counsel and client that the jury is in no position to explore, we understood the gravamen of Mr. Courtenay's submission to be that for the Judge to tell the Jury that the questions put to Sgt. Willoughby in cross-examination by Counsel for the Appellants were inconsistent with the Appellant's unsworn statements was unfair to the Appellants in that it was likely to cause the Jury to reject those statements, as untrue, whereas if the learned Trial Judge had pointed out to the Jury that it was possible to construe the Appellant Bent's unsworn statement as meaning that he and the other Appellant were at the scene but merely passing on their way to Pancho's Inn, there would have been no inconsistency with the questions put in cross-examination and the Jury would have been less likely to reject their unsworn statements. We...