Pilgrim v Perez

• Jurisdiction: Belize
• Court: Supreme Court (Belize)
• Judge: Barrington-Jones, J.
• Judgment Date: 30 March 1981
• Docket Number: Appeal No. 5 of 1980
• Date: 30 March 1981

Supreme Court

Barrington-Jones, J.

Appeal No. 5 of 1980

Pilgrim

and

Perez

D.G.Barrow, Esq. For the appellant

G. Quallo, Esq. for the respondent

Criminal law - Dangerous driving — Elements of offence — Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance — Whether conviction was unreasonable — Finding that there was sufficient evidence to show beyond doubt that the appellant drove his vehicle in a reckless manner which was dangerous to the public.

Barrington-Jones, J.

1 This is an appeal against the appellant's conviction by one of the magistrates in Belize City of Dangerous Driving contrary to Section 75(1) of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance (Chapter 62) on the 2nd July, 1980.

2 Mr. Barrow indicated that he was abandoning ground (1) of the notice of appeal and proceeded to argue the appeal on the following grounds:–

• (A) Evidence was wrongfully received or inadmissible evidence was wrongfully admitted by the lower Court and in the latter case there was not sufficient evidence to form the decision;

• (B) The decision was unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence; and

• (C) That the decision was based on a wrong principle.

3 After examining the testimony of the complainant and Sgt. Rene, Mr. Barrow was at pains to point out that the appellant's evidence was not challenged by cross-examination and he submitted therefore that it was improper for the learned magistrate to have preferred the evidence of the prosecution witnesses when the appellant's evidence was not discredited in any way. He said further that he was forced to the conclusion that the magistrate decided that he would accept the prosecution's version, without addressing his mind to the fact that there was no basis to reject the version given by the appellant. It was Mr. Barrow's contention that the complainant had failed to let the appellant pass and that the latter was indignant and took the view that the accident was caused by the callous driving of the complainant.

4 Finally, Mr. Barrow submitted that fault so as to constitute dangerous driving must be found in the manner of the appellant's driving and said that this had not been shown.

5 Mr. Quallo in reply said that notwithstanding the magistrate's reasons the court could have reached the same decision, and pointed out that the appellant's evidence coincided with the prosecution's evidence and thus there was no need for the prosecution to cross-examine the appellant's evidence in the court below. He further submitted that the prosecution did not have to prove the actual presence of pedestrians at the scene and said that it was sufficient that they might have been there. He said that the prudent driver would not overtake on the swing bridge which he described as a risky endeavour. It was his case that the appellant had been convicted on good grounds and had been leniently dealt with.

6 Now Section 75(1) provides that –

Reckless driving. “Every person who drives a motor vehicle on a road recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be on the road, shall be guilty of an offence …”

7 And it is relevant to keep in mind at least two of the Rules of the Road:–

“113-2 (a) When overtaking other vehicles he shall keep to the left or off side of such other vehicle.

(c) He shall not drive so as to overtake other traffic unless he has a clear and unobstructed view of the road ahead and he shall...