Patten v R

• Jurisdiction: Belize
• Court: Court of Appeal (Belize)
• Judge: Hogan, P.,Inniss, J.A.,Georges, J.A.
• Judgment Date: 03 March 1977
• Neutral Citation: BZ 1977 CA 2
• Docket Number: Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 1976
• Date: 03 March 1977

Court of Appeal

Hogan, P.; Inniss, J.A.; Georges, J.A.

Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 1976

Patten

and

Regina

Criminal Law - Defences — Insanity

Criminal Law - Murder — Defence of insanity

Interpretation - Belize Criminal Code, Ch.21 (B)

Facts: Whether law dealing with insanity as laid down in the Criminal Code, Ch.21 (Belize) is in terms identical with the law as laid down in England in the McNaghten Rules — Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the law

Facts: Appellant found to be acting under a delusion when he killed two persons

Held: That the McNaghten rules were not part of the law of Belize — The appellant acted under a delusion and would be an unfit subject for punishment only if because of a delusion resulting from some disease affecting the mind he cannot properly be considered to have any mental responsibility for his actions — No misdirection of jury — Appeal dismissed — Conviction and sentence affirmed.

Held: Necessary to show that appellant was an unfit subject for punishment because of the nature of the delusion under which he acted — Necessary to distinguish the law of insanity as it related to the McNaghten Rules and the law of insanity as laid down in the Criminal Code, Ch.21 — Jury not misdirected — Appeal dismissed — Conviction and sentence affirmed.

Held: One must look to language of code uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of the law and not starting with enquiring how the law previously stood and then assume that the Code was probably intended to leave it unaltered.

1 At some time between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m. on March 15, 1976, the noise of sharp reports attracted persons to run to Victoria Street in Belize City. Witnesses who came to the scene and later testified, stated that they saw the appellant standing over another man, Winston Tillett, who was then lying on the road and shooting at him at point bland range. One of the persons standing at her door looking on was Mrs. McGregor. She ran into her house. The appellant went to his house which was in the same yard and emerged shortly after with a stick and a machete. He knocked down Mrs. McGregor's door, and pursued and shot her in her house. P.C. Nunez who was also attracted by the reports chased and caught the appellant and grabbed from him a holster with a .25 revolver which he had in his hand. Using an obscenity the appellant stated- “the……… people have been disturbing me for a long time”. Both Tillett and Mrs. McGregor died and the appellant was charged with two counts of murder on each of which he was found guilty and sentenced to death.

2 The evidence produced by the prosecution was not seriously contested. On the record the attacks appear to have been completely unprovoked. There is no direct evidence of either Tillett or Mrs. McGregor having at any time “disturbed” the appellant.

3 One witness was called for the defence — Dr. Chaudry — a consultant psychiatrist who is superintendent of Seaview Hospital. He examined the appellant very shortly after the incident and testified that he was suffering from paranoiac schizophrenia and was insane. The appellant had a history of mental illness. He had been a patient at Seaview between January 21, 1963 and September 15, 1964 and again between June 24, 1965 and October 12, 1965, but there was no recent history of treatment.

4 The amended grounds of appeal set out four matters of complaint but of these, two were not in the final analysis seriously pressed and need but passing mention.

5 Ground 1 alleged that the verdict could not be supported having regard to the evidence. There was however an abundance of evidence that the appellant had shot and killed the two deceased persons quite deliberately and without provocation. As the argument developed, it was clear that the real complaint was that the learned trial judge had not adequately directed the jury on the issued of insanity.

6 Ground 3 alleged that the trial judge had failed properly to direct the jury on the possible verdicts. The trial judge left four possible verdicts to the jury — murder, manslaughter, guilty but insane or an acquittal. On the evidence he need have left only two — guilty of murder and guilty but insane. Counsel for the appellant concedes that this is the case.

7 Ground 2 alleged that the trial judge failed properly to direct the jury on the matter of the effect of insanity on intent. We do not think this complaint is justified. Insanity operates as a defence because, if proved, it establishes that an accused person would be incapable or forming the intent which is a prerequisite of the commission of the offence. Once a proper direction is given on insanity, however, this is enough since proof of insanity can only result in a verdict of guilty but insane. If the jury is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the accused person was insane, then any evidence which might have been led solely to establish insanity could not be used to support an argument that the accused was nevertheless incapable of forming the intention needed to constitute the offence. A specific direction therefore as to the effect of insanity on intent would not be necessary.

8 The fourth ground of appeal was developed in the course of the hearing as it became clear that the argument that the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence was in reality an attack on the summing-up of the learned trial judge. It raises the issue as to whether the law dealing with insanity as laid down in the Criminal Code, Ch. 21 (referred to hereafter as “The Code”) is in terms identical with the law in England as laid down in the McNaghten Rules.

9 The relevant section of the Code is section 23 which reads–

• “23. A person accused of crime shall be deemed to have been insane at the time he committed the act in respect of which he is accused–

  • (a) if he was prevented by reason of idiocy, imbecility or any mental derangement or disease affecting the mind, from knowing the nature or consequences of the act in respect of which he is accused;

  • (b) if he did the act in respect of which he is accused under the influence of a delusion of such a nature as to render him, in the opinion of the jury, and unfit subject for punishment of any kind in respect of such act.”

10 The evidence was that the appellant suffered from a delusion and acted under the influence of that delusion when he shot and killed Tillett and Mrs....