Michael v Perez

• Jurisdiction: Belize
• Court: Supreme Court (Belize)
• Judge: Barrington-Jones, J.
• Judgment Date: 30 March 1981
• Docket Number: Appeal No. 7 of 1980
• Date: 30 March 1981

Inferior Court

Barrington-Jones, J.

Appeal No. 7 of 1980

Michael

and

Perez

D.Barrow Esq. for the appellant

G. Quallo Esq. for the respondent

Practice and procedure - Appeal against conviction — Careless driving — Section 76 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance — Whether the decision was unreasonable and could not be supported by the evidence — Appeal dismissed.

Barrington-Jones, J.

1 The appellant was convicted of careless driving contrary to section 76 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance by one of the magistrates in Belize City on the 20th June 1980. The notice of appeal dated the 8th September 1980 set out the grounds of appeal as follows:–

• (1) The decision was erroneous in point of law;

• (2) The decision was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence; and

• (3) The decision was based on a wrong principle or was such that the Inferior Court viewing the circumstances reasonably could not properly have so decided.

2 Mr. Barrow stated that it was common ground that both drivers saw each other about 100 yards away. He said that the appellant saw a cyclist ahead of him proceeding in the same direction when he was about 25 feet the cyclist and that he swerved to avoid the cyclist and that his motor vehicle ended up across the road when it was run into by the oncoming vehicle. Mr. Barrow submitted that the entire case turned on the appellant having seen the cyclist in sufficient time so as not to have to take emergency action. He said that there was no suggestion that the appellant ought to have seen the cyclist from a greater distance, and pointed out that there was no evidence to show whether the road at that point was straight or curved. Mr. Barrow pointed out that the cyclist said that he had a red reflector on the back fender but stated that other prosecution witnesses did not see a reflector. Mr. Barrow suggested that it was a major failure of the prosecution's case that there was no other evidence of the existence of the cyclist's reflector, and submitted that the magistrate ought to have given careful thought to this. He further pointed out that the appellant had said in his testimony that the cycle did not have a reflector. It was admitted, however, that the magistrate had found as a fact that the cycle did have a reflector at the time of the accident. Mr. Barrow suggested that the magistrate's decision was based on a balance of probabilities and not at the standard of beyond reasonable doubt. Those were submissions on ground (1).

3 On ground (2) Mr. Barrow drew this court's attention to a passage in the magistrate's reasons, which reads:

“However, the court felt that in all the circumstances of the case including the fact that it was not raining nor was the defendant blinded by the light of the oncoming traffic or other impediment to vision - in fact the defendant said that he saw oncoming lights 100 yards away and also the man on the bicycle - that his swerving into the path of Hecker's vehicle to avoid hitting the cyclist on the right or else he would have killed...