(Melvin Reimer v (Attorney General of Belize (Commissioner of Police
| Jurisdiction | Belize |
| Judge | Madam Justice Sonya Young |
| Judgment Date | 13 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | CLAIM NO. 427 OF 2019 |
| Court | Supreme Court (Belize) |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BELIZE, A.D. 2019
BEFORE the Honourable Madam Justice Sonya Young
CLAIM NO. 427 OF 2019
Ms. Misty Marin, Counsel for Claimant/ Respondent.
Mrs. Samantha Matute-Tucker, Counsel for Defendant/Applicant
KEYWORDS: Civil — Strike Out — Statute Barred — Conversion — Vehicle - Limitation Act Cap 170 — Lost and Abandoned Property Act Cap 335
This is an Application to strike out the Claim as being statute barred.
The Claim is one in tort for conversion. The Claimant says the Second Defendant unlawfully confiscated and converted his 2014 Ford Edge motor vehicle for which he seeks damages including exemplary and/or aggravated.
He said he purchased the vehicle on or about the 18 th June, 2015 and duly registered and licensed same. On the 31 st October, 2017, he was visited by officers of the Transport Department in Belmopan who apparently suspected that the import duties had not been paid on the vehicle. The next day the vehicle was confiscated by the police.
When he visited the Major Crimes Unit in Belmopan around the 6 th November, 2017, he was then informed by Ismael Westby and Holly Vasquez, servants and agents of the Defendants and he believed that the vehicle would be released if he paid the duty. In writing, he subsequently indicated his willingness to do this and informed that he would not renounce the vehicle. This was about the 27 th November, 2017.
On the 4 th January, 2018, he was advised by Ismael Westby that the Defendants had decided to acquire the vehicle and have the title transferred. His attorney wrote to the Defendants seeking an explanation as to the legal basis on which the vehicle had been detained. There has been no response to rd that letter to date. He confirmed on the 23 rd January, 2018 that the vehicle had indeed been transferred to the Government of Belize.
He was never afforded an opportunity to be heard nor did he receive any compensation or the return of his vehicle.
In their Defence, the Defendants stated that the vehicle was reported as having been illegally imported. It was seized and secured at the National Police Training Academy.
The Claimant was informed of the circumstances surrounding the confiscation and he produced the certificate of title issued by the Belmopan National Transport Department. However, their investigation revealed that the importation and registration were both illegal and unlawful. The Claimant was invited to give a written statement which he did. He never filed a report.
The vehicle had, allegedly, been stolen and then imported into Belize. Since no request had been made by Guatemala for the return of the vehicle, the Police Department made a request to the Ministry of Finance for the vehicle to be confiscated and assigned to the Police Department.
On receipt of approval, the vehicle was registered in the Government's name and is currently being used for the performance of police duty. There was no need to pay compensation under the Lost and Abandoned Property Act.
Moreover, the Claim is statute barred not having been filed within one (1) year of the date on which the cause of action accrued. That date would either be the date it was seized (1 st November, 2017) or the date it was given to the Police Department (2 nd January, 2018).
Should the Claim be struck out as being statute barred and an abuse of process?
Section 27 of the Limitation Act:
“27. —(1) No action shall be brought against any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution, or intended execution of any Act or other law, or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any neglect or default in the execution of any such Act or other law, duty or authority, unless it is commenced before the expiration of one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
Provided that where the act, neglect or default is a continuing one, no cause of action in respect thereof shall be deemed to have accrued, for the purposes of this subsection, until the act, neglect or default has ceased.
(2) This section shall not apply to any action to which the Public Authorities Protection Act, Cap. 31 does not apply, or to any criminal proceeding.”
Counsel was resolute that the cause of action had accrued more than one year prior to the filing of this claim and ought not to be entertained. She referred to Donovan v Gwentoys Limited (1990) 1 WLR 472, which outlined the primary purpose of a limitation period as being “to protect a defendant from the injustice of having to face a stale claim with which he never expected to have to deal.”
She relied on Kimola Merritt v Dr. Ian Rodriguez, AG [2015] JMCA Civ 31, where the Court considered very similar limitation legislation in relation to the continuance of injury or damage. At paragraph 39, the Court stated:
“[39] In a later case, Freeborn v Leeming [1926] 1 KB 160, the question arose as to the meaning of the same statutory provision. In that case, the plaintiff was injured in an accident and on 6 September 1923 was placed under the care of the defendant who was the medical officer at a workhouse infirmary to which he was taken. The defendant negligently failed to diagnose the nature of the plaintiff's injury and made no attempt to give him treatment, which, if given at the time, would have effectively cured him. The plaintiff left the infirmary on 15 October 1923 and ceased to be under the care of the defendant. The plaintiff consulted another doctor who discovered that his hip was dislocated, but as it was then too late to apply the necessary remedy, the plaintiff's injury was permanent. On 25 April 1924, more than six months after he had ceased to be under the defendant's care, the plaintiff brought his action claiming damages.
[40] It was held on the authority of Carey, by which the court held itself bound, that the action was statute-barred by virtue of section 1 of the 1893 Act, it not having commenced ‘within six months next after the act, neglect, or default complained of’. Salter J said at page 164: ‘The words of the Act seem to me to be very plain. It is very easy to imagine cases of hardship and it may well be that by the time a cause of action has accrued, the happening of the damage as a result of the act, it may be too late to sue. But it must be remembered that this Act is obviously intended for the protection of public officers who are defendants. It assumes misconduct, and it is designed to protect public officers even where they have been guilty of misconduct. No doubt it contemplates an ‘act, neglect, or default’ complained of in an action. It seems quite clear that the date from which...
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