Justin Shaquiel Espat v PC 1058 Wayne Trapp
| Jurisdiction | Belize |
| Judge | Madam Justice Geneviève Chabot |
| Judgment Date | 24 November 2022 |
| Court | Supreme Court (Belize) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Docket Number | Claim No. 244 of 2022 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BELIZE, A.D. 2023
The Honourable Madam Justice Geneviève Chabot
Claim No. 244 of 2022
Oscar WA Selgado, for the Claimant
Samantha Matute, Imani Burgess, and Israel Alpuche, for the Defendants
The Claimant filed a Claim against the Defendants on April 4 th, 2022. The Claimant claims damages arising from injuries received when the 1 st Defendant allegedly unlawfully discharged his firearm upon a vehicle in which the Claimant was a passenger. The events at issue in the Claim occurred on April 11 th, 2019.
On June 20 th, 2022, the Defendants filed a Notice of Application to Strike Out the Claim on the ground that the Claim is statute-barred under section 27 of the Limitation Act. 1 The Defendants argue that the Claim is a claim in negligence against a public authority, and that it was filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued to the Claimant.
Having reviewed the written submissions of the parties, this Court finds that the Application is premature. The issue of whether the 1 st Defendant was acting bona fide in the exercise of his powers and duties as a public authority cannot be resolved without a trial. The Application is dismissed.
The Defendants argue that under section 27 of the Limitation Act, any action against a public authority for acts done in respect of any neglect must be commenced within one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued. Relying on Freeborn v Leeming, 2 cited in Kimola Merritt v Dr. Ian Rodriguez, AG, 3 the Defendants submit that the instant Claim is statute-barred because the Claimant has initiated his Claim some three years after the cause of action accrued.
The Defendants submit that this Court should interpret section 27 of the Limitation Act as intending to protect public officers, even where they may be guilty of misconduct, against a stale claim. The Defendants rely on Alves v Attorney General of the Virgin Islands (British Virgin Islands), 4 a decision of the Privy Council interpreting a similar limitation provision in the Virgin Islands' Public Authorities Protection Act, in support of their contention on this point.
The Defendants contend that the Public Authorities Protection Act 5 applies to this Claim. The Defendants are a “public authority” within the meaning of the Public Authorities Protection Act. The act complained of was done in pursuance to, or in the execution of the 1 st Defendant's duty. In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. Ltd v Singapore Harbour Board, 6 the Privy Council cited with approval a passage from Griffiths v Smith 7 in which the court said that “it is sufficient to establish that the act was in substance done in the course of exercising for the benefit of the public an authority or a power conferred on the public authority not being a mere incidental power”.
Here, the 1 st Defendant was empowered under the Police Act 8 to perform duties for the prevention, detection and apprehension of offenders and the enforcement of all laws, regulations, rules, and orders. Those powers can be exercised with the use of arms. There is no evidence to suggest that the 1 st Defendant was not on duty when the alleged injuries
The Defendants submit that there has been unreasonable delay on the part of the Claimant in initiating the Claim. The Claimant has not offered any reasons at all for this delay. To grant the relief sought by the Claimant would be detrimental to the good administration of justice, and would go against the intent and purpose of the protection offered by the Limitation Act.
The Defendants further argue that the Claim is an abuse of process and it is in the interest of justice that it be struck out.
The Claimant denies that his Claim is an abuse of process. The Claimant argues that section 27 of the Limitation Act can only be invoked if the 1 st Defendant was acting lawfully and had used justifiable and lawful force when he shot the rounds that injured the Claimant. The Claimant relies on the Privy Council's decision in Gordon (Lemuel) v Attorney General, 9 a case in which the Attorney General made an application to strike out the claim on the ground that the Limitation Act had barred the claim. The Privy Council denied the application, stating:
The statement of claim had raised two issues (ie whether the police officers had been acting bona fide in the execution of their duty and, if they had not, whether the Crown was nonetheless liable for their actions); neither issues could be resolved without a trial and, accordingly, the writ should not have been struck out.
The Claimant also relies on the decision of the Belize Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Cheryl Schuh and Arthur Schuh. 10
The Claimant notes that he was never charged with any offence by the police after he was shot. This, according to the Claimant, is “indicative that the policeman was on a frolic of his own and was acting outside the scope of his lawful duties” The police used unjustifiable and unlawful force by shooting the vehicle in which the Claimant was a passenger without ascertaining what had occurred and who were the persons responsible for those alleged occurrences, causing him to suffer injuries.
The Claimant argues that the Defendants interpret the case law without any consideration of their true legal enunciations. According to the Claimant, it is strict law that any illegal act committed by any agent of the State will not be governed by the Limitation Act. The
The Claimant submits that the overriding objectives of the Supreme Court ( Civil Procedure) Rules, 2005 (the “Rules”) would allow for a trial of the matter. Striking out the Claim would deprive the Claimant of his entitlement to the reliefs he seeks.
The Defendants note that the Claimant's contention that the 1 st Defendant “was on a frolic of his own” is not pleaded in the Claim. In the Claim Form, the Claimant has accepted that the 1 st Defendant was at all material times acting as an agent of the 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants, and as such that they are vicariously liable for the actions of the 1 st Defendant. The Claimant's contention should not be considered by this Court, and the Claimant cannot rely on the decisions in Gordon and Schuh.
This Court is empowered, under Rule 26.3(1)(b) of the Rules, to strike out a statement of case if it constitutes an abuse of process of the Court:
26.3 (1) In addition to any other powers under these Rules, the court may strike out a statement of case or part of a statement of case if it appears to the court–
[…]
(b) that the statement of case or the part to be struck out is an abuse of the process of the court or is likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings;
The Defendants submit that this Claim is statute-barred under section 27 of the Limitation Act. Section 27 provides as follows:
27.–(1) No action shall be brought against any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution, or intended execution of any Act or other law, or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any...
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