Gonzalo Ramirez v Nonita Encarnacion Ramirez
| Jurisdiction | Belize |
| Judge | Chabot, J |
| Judgment Date | 04 September 2023 |
| Court | Supreme Court (Belize) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Docket Number | CLAIM No. CV 346 of 2022 |
and
CLAIM No. CV 346 of 2022
IN THE SENIOR COURTS OF BELIZE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BELIZE
Nazira Uc Myles, for the Claimant
Deshawn Arzu Torres, for the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants
Agassi Finnegan and Imani Burgess, for the 3 rd and 4 th Defendants
Darinka Muñoz, for the Interested Party
This decision deals with three distinct applications to strike out the fixed date claim filed by the claimant for the recovery of four parcels of land. For the reasons outlined in this decision, the claim is dismissed with costs to the defendants and the interested party.
This matter involves the following four parcels of land, together referred to as the “Parcels” or the “Property”:
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1. Parcel 298 - Pembroke Hall Registration Area - Corozal (Previously Lot 30 in Louisville Layout, Corozal)
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2. Parcel 299 - Pembroke Hall Registration Area - Corozal (Previously Lot 25 in Louisville Layout, Corozal)
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3. Parcel 300 - Pembroke Hall Registration Area - Corozal (Previously Lot 26 in Louisville Layout, Corozal)
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4. Parcel 301 - Pembroke Hall Registration Area - Corozal (Previously Lot 27 in Louisville Layout, Corozal)
Title to Parcel 298 is currently in the name of Teichroeb & Sons (“Teichroeb”), who acquired it from the first defendant, Ms. Ramirez, on March 4 th, 2021. Ms. Ramirez currently holds title to Parcels 299 and 300, and her son, Mr. Guerra, holds title to Parcel 301.
The claimant filed this claim on May 30 th, 2022 to recover ownership of the Parcels. The claimant asserts that in 1978, he obtained the following leases from the Minister of Natural Resources:
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1. Lease 64 of 1978 dated February 9 th, 1978 on Lots 25 and 26
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2. Lease 66 of 1978 dated February 9 th, 1978 on Lots 27 and 30
With the assistance of a mortgage from the Royal Bank of Canada on Parcels 299 and 300 (then Lots 25 and 26), the claimant alleges that he began investing by clearing and building structures on the Property. He and his father approached Shell and Texaco with a view to developing a gas station on the leased Parcels. The project was approved and the claimant made the necessary investments. The gas station operated for a few months before being shut down. The claimant and his father also hired Belize Sugar Industries (“BSI”) to clear 15 acres of land and plant sugar cane on the Property. The sugar cane operation continued until the late 1980's, when it was stopped due to the deterioration of the fields and financial losses. The claimant also operated a business on the Property slaughtering 3 to 5 pigs every week and selling meat and fat.
The claimant alleges that he allowed his parents and siblings to move in with him on the Property and to “live rent free” as he wanted to help them. The claimant provided financial assistance to the family, and allowed his father to assist with the operations on the Property. In the early 1990's, the claimant's family left the Property but the claimant continued to assist them financially.
The claimant alleges that in 1991, with his permission, his father obtained a mortgage from the Belize Bank secured by Lease 66 of 1978. The creation of the mortgage was approved by the Minister on June 3 rd, 1991.
In 2011, the claimant allegedly paid off the remaining lease balance for all four Parcels, and cleared the old sugar cane and some additional acreage to plant new sugar cane. The sugar cane was registered and delivered to BSI in the claimant's wife's name until 2018.
In March 2020, the claimant noticed that a bulldozer had cleared a portion of the Property. He confronted his sister, Ms. Ramirez, who allegedly told him she was clearing a portion of the land because she needed a place to live. In August 2021, the claimant found out through a social media post that the Property was being cleared for the Renate By-Pass. The claimant contacted Teichroeb, who confirmed it had purchased Parcel 298 from Ms. Ramirez. A title search revealed that Parcels 299 and 300 were registered in the name of Ms. Ramirez, and Parcel 301 in the name of her son, Mr. Guerra.
The claimant claims that he has held a lease, has been paying rent to the Ministry of Natural Resources, has developed and used, and has been in continuous and undisturbed possession of the Parcels since 1978. He argues that he did not authorize, transfer, sell, or consent for titles to be issued or registered in the names of Ms. Ramirez, Mr. Guerra, or Teichroeb. He asserts that titles were obtained by these defendants by fraud and/or mistake.
The claimant seeks the following relief in the claim:
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1. Specific performance of the contract between the claimant and the 4 th defendant for purchase of the Properties.
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2. A declaration that the transfers of Parcels 298, 299, 300 and 301 from the 3 rd defendant to the 1 st and 2 nd defendants are void and a nullity, the 1 st and 2 nd defendants having obtained title to the said Properties by fraud.
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3. Further or in the alternative, a declaration that in the very least, the 3 rd defendant registered the titles in the name of the 1 st and 2 nd defendants by mistake.
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4. An order directing the Registrar of Lands of the 3 rd defendant to rectify the Land Registers in accordance with the provisions of Section 143 (1) of the Registered Land Act 1 by canceling or deleting the transfer in favor of the 1 st and 2 nd defendants and interested party.
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5. In the alternative, a declaration that the claimant has been in continuous and undisturbed possession for a period well in excess of twelve (12) years - 43 years of the Properties.
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6. A declaration that the claimant having been in open and undisturbed possession of all the Properties for a period well in excess of 12 years (43 years), the title of the 1 st and 2 nd defendants and interested party was extinguished pursuant to section 12 and 22 of the Limitation Act. 2
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7. An order that the 1 st and 2 nd defendants and interested party surrender their titles for the issue of title to the claimant upon an application by him for prescriptive title pursuant to Section 138 of the Registered Land Act.
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8. Further and in the alternative, damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment by the defendants.
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9. Interest on any amount of damages found to be due to the claimant in accordance with Section 166 of the Supreme Court Judicature Act. 3
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10. Costs.
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11. In addition, or in the alternative, the appropriate declarations and orders as would secure and enforce the rights of the claimant.
The defendants filed three distinct notices of application to strike out the claim. As each application deals with a different aspect of the claim, each will be considered
The claimant argues that the three applications to strike out the claim are preemptive, as they were filed before the claimant had a chance to file a reply to the affidavits filed as defences in this matter. The applications were made without the full pleadings being properly before the court. With respect to the Government defendants in particular, the claimant notes that they have yet to file any defence in this claim. According to the claimant, the evidence in support of their position should have been put in in response to the claim, not in support of their application because an application to strike out must be considered on the basis of the pleadings only. In addition, the claimant asserts that the 1 st hearing of the claim has yet to take place, and he can still amend his claim without permission from this court.
I find no merit in the claimant's procedural objection. Rule 26.3(1) of the Supreme Court ( Civil Procedure) Rules, 2005 (“CPR”) does not restrict the filing of an application to strike out a statement of case to any specific point in time. The claimant did not bring the court's attention to any rule or case law supporting his position that the defendants were prohibited from filing the applications to strike out before the Government defendants filed their affidavit in defence and before the claimant filed a reply. The overriding objective of the rules in the CPR is to enable the court to deal with cases justly, which includes ensuring that cases are dealt with expeditiously and saving expenses (CPR rules 1.1(2)(b) and (d)). This objective would be stifled if in all cases parties were required to expend the resources necessary to file their pleadings in response to cases which have no merit on their face.
I have also not been persuaded by the claimant's contention that the Government defendants were prohibited from presenting evidence in support of their application to strike out. CPR rule 11.9 dealing with applications generally provides that applications can be supported by evidence contained in an affidavit, unless a rule, a practice direction, or a court order otherwise provides. Applications to strike out a statement of case are not exempted from the general rule and can be supported by evidence if appropriate.
While the court must refrain from engaging in a mini-trial, it must “closely and carefully” scrutinize the facts pleaded. 4 This exercise may be helped by the evidence of another party giving context to the facts pleaded in the statement of case, provided that this evidence does not raise any conflicts on which the outcome of the claim may turn or difficult questions of law which call for careful deliberation. As noted by Young J. in Romero, “the court must simply ensure that the claimant's cause of action has substance...
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