Attorney General v Locke

• Jurisdiction: Belize
• Court: Supreme Court (Belize)
• Judge: Jones, J.
• Judgment Date: 31 March 1980
• Docket Number: Action No. 86 of 1976
• Date: 31 March 1980

Supreme Court

Jones, J.

Action No. 86 of 1976

Attorney General

and

Locke

The Solicitor-General for the plaintiff

Mr. D. Barrow for the defendant

Contract - Bond signed by defendant to facilitate his pursuit of degree in agriculture — Defendant resigned and government did not pursue the issue of breach for six years — Remedy of action on the bond not statute barred until after 12 years.

Jones, J.

1 This action was first heard on the 7th March, 1980 when it was agreed by the Solicitor-General and Mr. Dean Barrow that it would be preferable in the first instance to obtain a ruling on Mr. Barrow's contention that the action was, in fact, statute barred.

2 The court after hearing submissions on this matter adjourned the action to a date to be fixed for a ruling on that submission.

3 The document which grounds this action is a bond which was executed by the defendant on the 31st July, 1963, prior to his going off to McGill University in Canada to read for a degree in agriculture. The defendant later tendered him resignation from the public service on the 24th August, 1966; and whilst there was an exchange of correspondence between the Government of Belize and the defendant in 1969 thereafter the matter of any obligations under the bond lay dormant for some six years until the Government of Belize in the person of the Permanent Secretary Establishment wrote to the defendant on 3rd November, 1975 enquiring what arrangements the defendant intended to make in respect of an outstanding balance under the bond of $5,126.69. The defendant in his reply dated the 17th November, 1975 stated, inter alia. that he had written to government on the 17th January, 1969 requesting that it withdraw the demand for further payment upon his return to Belize (this having occurred on the 13th July, 1969). The defendant said that it was reasonable for him to assume from government's silence for such a long period of time that “this matter against me had been dropped”. Thereafter the defendant set out his activities in the private sector and took the view that for the government to press him for repayment of the debt was not only a disservice to the country but would create a poor image on the part of government. He concluded his letter by saying that he was not in a position to arrange a suitable settlement of the debt and requested that the government withdraw its demand for such repayment.

4 Now it is the Solicitor-General's case that the defendant admitted in his letter the existence of the debt, and notes that he does not deny that it is still a valid debt; the Solicitor-General points out that the writ in this case was taken out on the 24th July, 1976 and submits that the defendant's letter effectively takes the matter out of the original limitation period — pointing out that the writ was filed within one year of the defendant's letter and thus well within one year of that letter. He then referred the court to Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edition Vol. 24 at paragraph 593 in support of his contention. This paragraph reads:–

“No particular form required. An acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the maker ….….. but, subject to these requirements, it need not be in any particular form. No promise to pay is now required. All that is necessary is that the debtor should recognize the existence of the debt or that the person who might rely on the statute should recognize the rights against himself. Whether the document is or is not an acknowledgment depends on what the document states. The construction of a document put forward as containing an acknowledgment is for the court alone ……… In judging whether a document is a sufficient acknowledgment the court will look at the circumstances in which it was written, and will construe it in the way in which the writer intended it to be construed by the person to whom it is addressed.”

5 The Solicitor-General submitted that the defendant's letter speaks for itself. He said that in his view the bond, being a document under seal, is a specialty. In support of this contention he referred to Section 6 of the Limitation Ordinance.

6 Section 6 reads:- “An action upon a specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the cause of action accrued: provided that this section shall not affect any action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance” and urged that such an action would only be statute barred after twelve years.

7 Mr. Barrow, on the other hand, submitted that the defendant's letter was not in fact an acknowledgment of the debt. He took the view that far...